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Abstract
Traditional leadership often coexists with modern political institutions, yet we know little about
how traditional and state authority cues—or those from male or female sources—affect public
opinion. Using an original survey experiment of 1,381 Malawians embedded in the 2016 Local
Governance Performance Index (LGPI), we randomly assign respondents into one of four
treatment groups or a control group to hear messages about a child marriage reform from a
female or male traditional authority (TA) or parliamentarian. In the sample as a whole, the
female TA is as effective as the control (i.e., no endorsement), while other messengers elicit
lower support (i.e., backfire effects). Endorsements produce heterogeneous effects across
respondent sex and patrilineal/matrilineal customs, suggesting the need for tailored programs.
Our analysis adds an intersectional approach to the governance literature, suggesting a
theoretical framework that enables us to explain the impact of state and traditional endorsements
across policy domains.

Keywords: Traditional authorities * Gender * Policy advocacy * Malawi * Africa * Child
marriage
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Introduction
How and why do authority type and gender shape citizen’s acceptance of women’s
rights reforms? International agents increasingly see traditional leaders as partners in
development (Baldwin, 2016), enlisting them as advocates for legal reforms which curb gender
discriminating practices, such as setting a minimum age of marriage (Muriaas et al., 2018).
Earlier research saw traditional authorities (TAs) as antithetical to women’s rights (Charrad,
2001; Hudson et al, 2015). Increasingly, however, development practitioners suggest that it is
necessary not only to engage activists, but also to compel accountability from dominant social
agents (Toyo, 2006). These strategies are based on studies demonstrating that traditional leaders
are highly respected and play a major role in African contemporary politics (Logan, 2009),
Yet, despite the growing recognition about the importance of TAs as partners for
development, we know little about whether traditional leaders, considered key custodians of
culture (Charrad, 2001; Englebert, 2000), are effective promoters of women’s rights issues
among common citizens. Moreover, the answer may depend on the leader’s gender in some
important ways. While men have greater authority, due to their predominance in positions of
power (Eagly and Karau, 2002), this assumption may not hold for gender rights—a policy
domain associated with female competencies. For instance, there is considerable evidence, drawn
from the gender and politics literature and role congruity theory, that citizens expect female
leaders to prioritize and excel in matters relating to health, education, and women’s rights
(Lawless, 2004; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; Rosenwasser and Seale, 1988). Their role in this
regard may simply be seen as more acceptable than that of engaging in other more traditionally
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male-oriented policy domains (Eagly and Karau, 2002). 1 Yet, authority gender, as well as
authority institution—whether state or traditional authorities—have seldom been considered in
connection with policy advocacy.
This article draws on insights from several literatures and develops expectations about
the role of traditional and state authorities in shaping citizens’ attitudes about child marriage
reform—a gendered human right. 2 As noted, the emerging literature on governance and
traditional leadership suggests that traditional leaders may have a greater capacity to organize
and broker responses to rural problems than elected politicians (Cammack et al., 2009; DíazCayeros et al., 2014; Baldwin, 2016), although we still need more research to unpack how and
why this is the case. We contribute to and extend these ongoing discussions by testing whether
traditional leaders have a more positive effect on policy advocacy for human rights reform than
elected officials. Few studies examine TAs’ effectiveness as public opinion influencers and to
our knowledge, ours is the first to examine the impact of female TAs specifically. For instance, a
study by Bush and Jamal (2015) shows that although most Jordanians report favorable attitudes
about imams, endorsements by religious authorities do not improve support for women’s
representation. Bush and Jamal’s study does not, however, differentiate authorities by gender.

1

Briefly, gender role congruity theory argues that prejudice against female leaders arises from

the incongruity between traits associated with the female gender roles (e.g., that women are
nurturing) and leadership roles (e.g., decisiveness), which are based on leaders of the past, who
are often men (Eagly and Karau, 2002).
2

Child marriage is regarded as a women’s rights issue because the practice has grave

implications for women’s health, education, and economy (see Toyo, 2006).
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Moreover, Benstead et al. (2015) examine the electability of female and religious candidates, but
do not look at their impact as public opinion influencers, even though this is an important and
overlooked form of symbolic representation (Bauer, 2016). 3 Clayton (2014) is the only scholar to
argue that gender may matter across authority type. Her work in Lesotho suggests that traditional
leaders have less power when they are elected in local electoral divisions that are reserved for
women.
So too, the gender and politics literature places substantial emphasis on how female
leaders shape agendas and influence political outcomes (Bauer, 2012; Franceschet et al., 2012;
Tamale, 1999; Wang, 2013). Still, this research focuses almost entirely on state actors, such as
parliamentarians (MPs) and cabinet ministers, and does not examine the role of leaders’ gender
in their governance effectiveness. Analyses of how female MPs shape attitudes and a focus on
gendered aspects of traditional leadership is missing. This gap exists in part because scholars
and practitioners assume that traditional leaders are men, and they expect TAs to promote
patriarchal practices (Bauer, 2016; Htun and Weldon, 2010). Yet, female traditional leaders are
almost as common as female elected representatives in countries such as Malawi and rural
Zambia, where matrilineal cultural practices exist. In Malawi, 10 percent of traditional leaders
are women, while 13 percent of local and 17 percent of national elected seats are held by
females. Some female traditional leaders have also forwarded feminist goals. For instance,

3

Symbolic representation: “altering gendered ideas about the roles of women and men in

politics, raising awareness of what women can achieve as political actors and legitimizing
them as political actors, or encouraging women to become involved in politics” (Bauer and
Burnet, 2013, 104).
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female senior chief Theresa Kachindamoto of Dedza District in Malawi figured prominently in
the world media in April 2016, when she annulled 850 child marriages and suspended all village
heads that refused to ban the practice of child marriage. 4 Among the Chewa people of Malawi,
Mozambique, and Zambia, women played a key role in the selection of their paramount Chief,
the Kalonga, who rules on behalf of his mother, called Nyangu. In countries like Botswana,
while no woman has served as president, a woman has also been paramount chief (Bauer,
2016). 5 Despite the importance of female traditional leaders in Africa and Asia, their impacts as
policy advocates are unexplored.
To address this gap, we employ an original framing experiment embedded in a survey
conducted in Malawi in 2016, which allows us to examine the impact of authority type (whether
traditional or elected) and authority gender (male versus female) on citizens’ support for human
rights reforms linked to women’s rights. Specifically, we randomly assign 1,381 respondents to
either a control group or to one of four treatment groups to receive a statement from a male MP,
male TA, female MP, or female TA. This allows us to test competing hypotheses drawn from
institutional trust and role congruity theories to explain the impact of different messengers on

4

See for instance Huffington Post ‘How This Female Chief Broke Up 850 Child Marriages In

Malawi’ by Sarah Ruiz-Grossman, 1 April 2016. Retrieved from
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/woman-chief-breaks-up-850-child-marriages-inmalawi_us_56fd51c2e4b0a06d580510da
5

Other examples of women traditional leaders are the queen mothers in the Akan chieftaincy in

Ghana (Mensah et al., 2014, p. 207), and the Ndlovukati, the queen mother in the Kingdom of
Swaziland, see Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland (Article 7).
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citizens’ support for child marriage reforms and to apply both theories in a novel way to
traditional governance and policy advocacy.
Our results show that, in the sample as a whole and among female and matrilineal
population subgroups, the female TA is as effective as the control. But, the female TA was never
significantly more effective than the female MP. Examining average treatment effects, we find
that the female MP, male MP, and male TA elicited a backfire effect—a decline in support for
the law relative to when no endorsement was presented. The male MP was the most effective
messenger among patrilineal citizens, while causing a backfire effect among matrilineal citizens.
Overall, our findings underline important dynamics associated with the promotion of
women’s rights reform in communities where traditional authorities prevail. Our results suggest
that traditional institutions influence citizens’ attitudes and that the impact of endorsements
depends on authority gender and respondents’ gender and lineage practices. They also suggest
some caution when it comes to advocating for sensitive gender reforms. In no case (i.e., in the
sample as a whole, or among any sub-group) did an endorsement increase support for the reform
relative to the control.
Our results thus emphasize the need for an intersectional theory of policy advocacy that
takes into account both authority type and gender, as well as the population group. For subgroups
that are familiar with women as leaders, women tend to be trusted advocates for family law
reform. This indicates that women leaders are not just tokens, but key gatekeepers for local
reforms at least within a policy area where they have stereotyped competences. Our findings,
therefore, call for further research that explores how background characteristics of traditional
authorities may affect what kind of power they have to change attitudes.
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The article proceeds in five sections. Following this introduction, in section two we
introduce the concept of dual governance and explain why a traditional leader’s gender is likely
to impact policy advocacy effectiveness across policy areas. We proceed by placing child
marriage reform and the role of traditional leaders in Malawi in a comparative perspective,
focusing on previous work on gender equality in countries with dual governance. In section
three, we move to develop our hypotheses about the intersectional impact of authority and
gender, and we draw on insights from both institutional trust and gender role congruity theories.
Section five presents our results and discussion. It shows that the female traditional leader is, in
the sample as a whole, as effective as the control (i.e., average treatment effect), but that various
subgroups are affected differently by the endorsements (i.e., heterogeneous treatment effects). A
concluding section completes our paper.

DUAL GOVERNANCE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THE CASE OF MALAWI
Dual governance and traditional leadership is a global phenomenon, found in developing
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In systems of dual governance,
ethnic groups are often legally recognized and customary law and other forms of law coexist
(Holzinger et al., 2016, p. 469). Across Africa, European colonialization and indirect rule
established local intermediaries to govern the capital, leaving TAs intact in the hinterlands
(Mamdani, 1996, p. 18). Urban, direct, civil rule spoke the language of civil society and civil
rights, while rural tribal authorities enforced tradition. Since independence, governments across
Africa have adopted different and evolving strategies toward TAs; some formally incorporated
traditional governance institutions into their political systems, while others denied them
recognition (Mijiga, 1998; Bank and Southall, 1996). Currently, traditional authorities typically
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play an important role within the area of internal security, land and resource allocation, public
health, and matters relating to marriage and inheritance (Holzinger et al., 2016).
TAs have often been seen by scholars and policymakers as antithetical to gender equality,
particularly in societies with patrilineal tribes in which the male head benefits from maintaining
control over women’s marriage choices. For instance, Charrad’s (2001, p. 233) study of state
formation and family law in North Africa shows that strong, patrilineal tribes led states to adopt
conservative family laws which allowed tribes to preside over kinship and reproduction,
negatively affecting women’s rights. Similarly, Htun and Weldon (2010; forthcoming) identify
historical state accommodation of cultural, traditional, and religious groups as a cause of
resistance against gender equality reforms. These studies show that many religious, traditional,
and tribal authorities perceive their continued power as dependent on maintaining control over
kinship and reproduction. From here, Hudson et al. argue that the particular kinds of female
subordination—child marriage, cousin marriage, prevalence of polygyny, or sanction for honorbased violence against women—“serve as indicators of the degree to which clans are salient to
governance in a given society” (2015, p. 540). This literature, which focuses largely on
patrilineal tribes, thus points to traditional leaders as a group that would possibly resist gender
equality reform rather than promote it.
Villalón’s (2010) study of democratization in the Sahel explains why family law reform
has been difficult to achieve in the last few decades, despite governments’ intention to alter
discriminatory practices. According to Villalón, elected leaders might not be the strongest
champions of change in contexts where they seek to maintain support from religious and
traditional leaders. This argument is supported by Kang (2015) who, based on studies from
Niger, argues that while women activists are critical drivers of change, state authorities are less
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likely to adopt women’s rights policies when conservative religious activists mobilize against
them.
In recent years, however, traditional leaders have been included in strategies to challenge
discriminatory cultural practices that are considered detrimental to women and children in
Malawi and elsewhere. In a comparative study of resistance to child marriage reform in Sudan
and Zambia, which have patrilineal as well as matrilineal ethnic groups, Muriaas et al. (2018)
found that including traditional leaders in comprehensive campaigns prevented countermobilization. 6 Through inclusion, traditional leaders gained a sense of ownership over the policy
and were trained to increase their understanding of how child marriage contributed to school
dropout. Importantly, the strategy did not threaten traditional leaders’ powers—as law reform
only challenged current practices—or their position as administrators of the law.
Inclusion of TAs in programs to promote development and women’s rights is linked to
their proximity to the issues and respondents, and the high trust people have in them. Traditional
institutions in Malawi play a key role in local communities, and are present across the country. 7
For most Malawians, traditional leaders combine time-honored as well as cultural functions with
serving as government agents to mobilize subjects for development activities in their areas and
advancing the government’s agenda. Figure 1 shows that the majority of Malawian citizens

6

In these societies, as well as in Malawi, there are two lineage systems, depending on whether

citizens trace descent through women (matrilineal) or through men (patrilineal; Kaarhus, 2010).
7

In Malawi, the role of traditional leaders was legislated as far back as 1912, when the colonial

administration passed the District Administration (Native) Ordinance, which created a new
hierarchy of “traditional” authority involving principal and village headmen.
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consider traditional leaders to be relevant in the democratic political space. Equally, around twothirds of the country’s citizens approve of traditional leaders taking part in district council
meetings alongside elected councilors. Citizens’ high confidence in TAs cannot be directly
linked to accountability, at least in the form of electoral accountability; TAs are not elected and
are not easily removed, but the president can reduce chiefs’ privileges and status.

Figure 1. Perceived relevance of traditional leaders and acceptance of their participation in district council
meetings. Source: Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Malawi, and Centre
for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, 2016. Question wording: “Do you approve or
disapprove of the current system of having TAs sit as members of the District Council?” “In your
opinion, how relevant are traditional leaders in modern day Malawi. Would you say they are not relevant
at all, not relevant, relevant or very relevant?”

Efforts to include traditional leaders as partners are based on studies showing a high
degree of popular trust in traditional leadership. Survey results from the Afrobarometer reinforce
the high public regard that TAs in Malawi enjoy as compared to elected officials. Malawians are
more likely to approve of the performance of TAs than MPs. Figure 2 illustrates that TAs are
more trusted than the MPs.
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Figure 2. Trust and performance approval for traditional and elected leaders in Malawi
(Afrobarometer, 2014). Source: Afrobarometer R6 2014.Question wording: “How much do you
trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” “Parliament,”
“Traditional leaders.” "Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have
performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to
say?” “Your MP" and "Your traditional leader.”

In addition to being a country where traditional leaders are held in high regard, trusted,
and seen as more accessible, Malawi is a useful case because it has undergone several attempts
to implement reforms that address long-standing cultural traditions considered discriminatory
and obstructive to effective development. A recent legal reform in this respect is the Marriage,
Divorce, and Family Relations Act (The Marriage Act) of 2015, which banned child marriage.
Child marriage is commonly defined as a formal marriage or informal union entered into before
the age of 18. The importance of this reform is underscored by the fact that Malawi has one of
the highest rates of child marriage in the world: 50% of girls marry before age 18 (UNFPA,
2012). The country is ranked 9th internationally in terms of child marriage prevalence (UNICEF,
2015), which is common across all three regions of the country, but highest in the central region
(57%).
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Although other studies that seek to examine public support for law reforms on issues
ranging from female genital mutilation, criminalizing spousal abuse, and ending child marriage
have established some levels of social desirability bias among survey respondents (see e.g.
Cloward, 2014), public support for the law banning child marriage remains important in a
number of ways. Public support makes the enforcement of the law less costly on the state, as
members of the public and local leaders can be relied upon to police the application of the law.
Additionally, reforms that seek to induce behavioral change, as is the case of the Marriage Act,
are more likely to succeed if they are accepted by the wider public (Bilz and Nadler, 2014, p.
246). This is particularly the case as customary norms and practices are identified as factors
contributing to upholding the practice in Malawi (WLSA and NGOGCN, 2009; Panos, 2015). 8
To curb the practice of child marriage, international development agents and the Malawi
government emphasized the importance of including traditional leaders in the campaign
(Kachali, 2013; Chimjeka, 2016). This is unsurprising, since most child marriages are conducted
under customary law and presided over by village headmen, who are widely considered in
Malawian society to be custodians of culture (Cammack et al., 2009). Traditional leaders across
the country have been urged by the government to develop action plans against child marriage
and have attended workshops where they have been acquainted with different aspects of the law.
While senior chief Theresa Kachindamoto is the most well-known activist of the campaign,

8

In Malawi the key argument used to gather support for the child marriage reform was that early

marriage causes girls to drop out of school. Another important argument was that a consequence
of early pregnancies is worsening of women’s health due to for instance the preponderance of
fistulas, and how this again affects women’s participation in the economy negatively.
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several male traditional leaders have also endorsed it (Kachali, 2013). It is, however, likely that
we will find clear differences between Malawians with different cultural backgrounds, as well as
variation in the traditional norms of the two lineages systems, matrilineal and patrilineal, which
have different practices with regard to women’s role in political leadership (Posner, 2004, p.
533).

WHO MAKES A GOOD POLICY ADVOCATE?
MESSENGER INSTITUTION AND GENDER
We draw on gender role congruity and institutional trust to anticipate the effects of male
and female traditional and state authorities on citizens’ views of child marriage. Combining these
two theoretical models enables us to understand how messenger institution and gender
intersectionally shape popular views across different population subgroups.
The Role of Messenger Institution: Trust
Much of the existing literature on endorsement experiments is drawn from social
psychology and communications theory and argues that the impact of endorsements depends on
the extent to which receivers trust the messenger. Following Arceneaux and Kolodny (2009),
authority cues could compensate for respondents’ lack of awareness about politics. Receivers are
likely to be swayed by messages from those they trust without analyzing the content of the
endorsement. This occurs because receivers use simple heuristics, such as whether or not they
like or trust the source, when engaging with endorsements (Carmines and Kuklinski, 1990;
Mondak, 1993). Consistently with this theory, Masoud et al. (2016) find that respondents
exposed to an argument in favor of women’s political empowerment grounded in a religious
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rather than a nonreligious argument are more likely to express support for female political
leaders, due to their trust in religious institutions.
Applied to our endorsement experiment comparing messengers from two institutions, an
institutional trust theory leads us to expect that TAs are more effective messengers than state
authorities, due to their proximity to the people and the high trust placed in them by the public. It
follows that male and female TAs will be more effective than male and female MPs (H1). 9
The Role of Messenger Gender: Gendered Authority and Policy Congruence
Yet, existing literature examining the impact of traditional authorities (Bush and Jamal,
2015) or institutions (Masoud et al., 2016) does not theorize about how the impact of these
endorsers depends intersectionally on their gender. To theorize about this, we draw on gender
role congruity theory and related work from women and politics research. Gender role congruity
theory was originally developed by Eagly and Karau (2002) to explain women’s
underrepresentation in business leadership and has subsequently been applied to political
leadership (King and Matland, 2002; Benstead et al., 2015). Gender role congruity theory
stipulates that prejudice against female leaders arises from the incongruity between traits
associated with the female gender roles (e.g., that women are nurturing) and leadership roles
(e.g., decisiveness), which are based on leaders of the past, who are often men. Stemming from

9

A related literature on the influence of cue sources suggests that political information has a

greater impact not only when the recipient trusts the messenger, but also when the message goes
against the sender’s interests and thus seems more credible (Dragojlovic, 2015; Weber,
Dunaway, and Johnson, 2012). This would suggest that male TAs and MPs will be more
effective than female TAs and MPs.
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descriptive norms, women as potential occupants of leadership roles are evaluated less favorably
than men because leadership ability is more stereotypical of men than women. Originating from
injunctive norms, women’s leadership behavior is evaluated less positively because such
behavior is perceived as less desirable in women than men (Eagly and Karau, 2002; Eagly and
Diekman, 2006).
One possible implication of gender role congruity theory is that, on the whole, women
will be seen as less authoritative than men and thus be less successful policy endorsers. Yet, to
the extent that policy domain is considered consistent with behavior that is perceived as
appropriate for women (e.g., to be concerned with family and gender issues), their leadership
may be more welcome. Related work in women and politics posits that political leaders will be
stereotyped as having different policy competencies, related to traditional gender roles, and this
leads to slightly different expectations in a context in which the policy—child marriage—is
closely linked to the stereotyped traits and competencies of women. While men are often
associated with having the traits needed for effective leadership, male and female leaders are
stereotyped as more competent in policy domains consistent with gender roles (Huddy and
Therkildsen, 1993; Rosenwasser and Seale, 1988; Lawless, 2004). 10 Women are seen as
competent in policy areas such as children, marriage, family, and education, while men are
stereotyped as competent in areas such as economy, land, and security. Since the policy domain
examined in this study relates to perceived female competencies, a competing expectation to that
of under-evaluation and male authority is that female TAs and MPs will be seen as more

10

Consistently with this theory, women often play a central role in advocating for policies that

are consistent with liberal gender laws (Bauer 2012; Wang, 2013).
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competent messengers of anti–child marriage (i.e., family-related) messages and will sway
public opinion more in the intended direction than will male TAs and MPs (H2).
It may also be the case that institutional trust and gender role congruity theory work in
tandem, producing intersectional effects. H3 posits that the female TA, since she benefits from
both high trust (H1) as well as perceived policy competence (H3) will be more effective than
other endorsers.
Average treatment effects:
H1: Overall, TAs will be more effective endorsers of anti–child marriage messages than MPs.
(Institutional trust hypothesis)
H2: Overall, female authorities will be more effective endorsers of anti–child marriage messages
than male authorities. (Gendered policy competence hypothesis)
H3: Overall, Female TAs will be more effective than other endorsers. (Intersectional hypothesis)

Heterogeneous Effects
Institutional trust and gender role congruity theories also lead us to expect stronger
impacts among citizens who are more likely to trust and hold more gender role congruent
attitudes toward female leaders—namely, female and matrilineal citizens. Gender congruent
attitudes are those that are more accepting of women as equally good political leaders, due to
overlapping gender and leader roles (Eagly and Karau, 2002). 11 Males have the role of family

11

Role incongruity prejudice is found to be moderated by a number of conditions, including the

definition of leader roles, the weight given to the leader roles relative to the female gender role,

Gender and Traditional Authorities

19

head in both family structures, but in matrilineal communities women are surrounded by their
natal extended families rather than those of their husbands and, therefore, may be able to assert
more authority (Phiri, 1983). Although a shift towards increasing male control has been noted
within matrilineal lineage systems, the authority of women in these systems has also proven very
resilient (Peters, 1997). This implies that female and matrilineal citizens not only hold more role
congruent views, but also that they will have higher trust in female leaders than will male and
patrilineal citizens.

Heterogeneous treatment effects:
H4: Female messengers will increase support more among female than male respondents.
H5: Female messengers will increase support more among matrilineal than patrilineal citizens
respondents.

Thus far, we have considered the relative impact of the four authority types relative to
one another. Now, we consider how endorsements might impact attitudes relative to the control
conditions—that is, no endorsement. Literature from political psychology shows that people
process information in a way that is consistent with their preexisting beliefs and often engage in
motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Molden and Higgins, 2005; Goren et al., 2009). Scholars
identify two mechanisms: biased assimilation—effects in the direction of the information—and
backfire effects—impacts in the opposite direction of the statements. Lord et al. (1979)
demonstrated biased assimilation by showing how scientific studies confirming participants’

gender (men often show stronger prejudice), and time—e.g., change of attitudes about gender
roles over time and change in the definition of leader roles (Eagly and Karau, 2002).
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attitudes were interpreted more positively than studies disconfirming their attitudes. Multiple
laboratory studies later corroborated this bias (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Miller et al., 1993;
Zuwerink and Devine, 1996), as have field studies (e.g., Ahluwalia, 2000; Munro et al., 2002).
However, other evidence across different experimental contexts shows that distrust of the
messenger can also lead to strong, often contradictory, responses. Instead of discounting
information from a source that is mistrusted, the recipient comes to hold even stronger views
after encountering the message. Referred to as a backfire effect, this occurs because recipients
spend more time considering and counter-arguing the information, arriving at more strongly held
views than they had before (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). Ditto and Lopez (1992) first identified a
backfire effect when participants in experiments required more information to reach a
preference-inconsistent conclusion than a preference-consistent conclusion and processed
information more critically. In another study of citizen misperceptions, Nyhan and Reifler (2010)
conducted experiments in which they document several instances of backfire effects when
corrections increase misconceptions. In a study of support for women’s representation in Jordan,
endorsements by authorities, like religious leaders and American actors, depressed support
significantly more among regime critical women compared to loyalists (Bush and Jamal, 2015:
p. 35).
Accordingly, we anticipate that endorsements could have a negative impact—referred to
as a backfire effect—relative to the control and this effect could be particularly pronounced
among those who have less trust in female endorsers—that is, male and patrilineal citizens.
Backfire effects (relative to the control) are also possible in the sample as a whole, particularly if
they are sufficiently strong among a large segment of the population. Thus, we expect that
effects can be positive among those who trust the messenger (relative to the control)—evidence
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for biased assimilation—or negative among those who do not trust the messenger (relative to the
control)—evidence for backfire effects.

Heterogeneous treatment effects:
H6: (i) Female messengers will increase support more among female and matrilineal respondents
relative to the control. (ii) Male messengers will increase support more among male and
patrilineal respondents relative to the control. (Biased assimilation)
H7: (i) Female messengers will decrease support more among male and patrilineal respondents
relative to the control. (ii) Male messengers will decrease support more among female and
matrilineal respondents relative to the control. (Backfire effect)

DATA AND METHODS
To assess the factors that shape greater support for laws setting the age of marriage at 18
years of age and the impact of different messengers on support for these laws, we draw on a
survey experiment embedded within the Local Government Performance Index (LGPI),
conducted in Malawi in 2016. 12 Regular public opinion surveys and other kinds of observational
data may not be able to detect prejudice against female authorities, either because gender
prejudices are subconscious or because the answers are tainted by socially desirable responses
12

Lust, E., Harris, A., Kao, K. Landry, P.F., Dulani, B., Zgambo, A., Chiweza, A., Kayuni, H.,

Muriaas, R.L., Rakner, L., Wang, V., Benstead, L., Hartmann, F., and Nickel, S. (2016) “The
Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI) Malawi Dataset.” Program on Governance and
Local Development, University of Gothenburg. Replication files for this article are available on
the Comparative Political Studies website.
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(Dolan and Sanbonmatsu, 2011, p. 289). A probability-based survey experiment allows us to
implicitly test the power of gender cues relative to the power of authority cues on citizens’
attitudes, while reducing the effects of social desirability and conformity bias (Benstead, 2014).
The survey used probabilistic sampling to select 17 TA areas in rural Malawi and an
additional five local government wards in urban centers. Post-stratification weights were added
to correct imbalances created by differential response rates across population sub-groups,
especially an under-representation of men, many of whom were working in neighboring villages,
towns, or outside the country. The response rate was 94.5% (AAPOR Response Rate 1).
While 7,500 Malawians participated in the survey, 1,381 randomly selected respondents
received the experimental prompts. Tests showed that the random assignment of participants into
the sample was effective and there were no differences in response rates across the frames.
However, the condition was significantly related to cultural customs (see Appendix 1).
Therefore, we include several control variables in the ordered logistic regressions.
Survey Design
To understand the role of different authorities in increasing opposition to child marriage,
we asked respondents to rate on a four-point scale the extent to which they agree that the
minimum age of marriage should be raised to 18. A control group received no frame;
respondents from this group were simply asked the extent to which they would support the law to
increase the marriage age to 18. Four treatment groups received the endorsement of a female
MP, female TA, male MP, or male TA before being asked whether they would support the law
(Table 1).
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Table 1. Experimental design
Control:
The parliament has passed a new law that sets the minimum age of marriage at 18. What do
you think of the law? Do you support it strongly, support it, not support it, or not support it
strongly? (N=286)
Female MP:
A female MP is supporting the new law that sets the minimum age of marriage at 18.What do
you think of the law? Do you support it strongly, support it, not support it, or not support it
strongly? (N=265)
Female TA:
A female TA is supporting the new law that sets the minimum age of marriage at 18.What do
you think of the law? Do you support it strongly, support it, not support it, or not? (N=272)
Male MP:
A male MP is supporting the new law that sets the minimum age of marriage at 18.What do
you think of the law? Do you support it strongly, support it, not support it, or not support it
strongly? (N=266)
Male TA:
A male TA is supporting the new law that sets the minimum age of marriage at 18.What do
you think of the law? Do you support it strongly, support it, not support it, or not support it
strongly? (N=283)

The conditions are realistic in Malawi. In 2014, 17 percent of candidates winning a seat
in the national parliament (193 members) were women, which means that Malawi scores beneath
the regional average of 23.5% (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017). Out of the total of 257 TAs for
example, only 25 (10 percent) are women. Women chiefs are most common in the densely
populated southern region where matrilineal lineage systems dominate and particularly in
Mulanje, Phalombe, Thyolo, and Zomba. This is just slightly lower than the 13 percent and 17
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percent of women representation at local government and parliamentary levels respectively
(Dulani and Dionne, 2014).
We carefully considered different ways of formulating the control and the treatment
conditions in order to make them as similar as possible. Some might consider the control to be a
stronger statement because it mentions that the new law was passed by parliament, while the
treatments stated that the new law was supported by different actors. However, we see no reason
that the new law being passed as opposed to being supported would connote a stronger treatment.
This is because we expect that respondents would have interpreted this question through the lens
of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Law of 2015. At the time of the survey in 2016
there was still continuing public debate over the provisions of the new law and also ongoing
initiatives by government, legislators, and civil-society organizations to sensitize the public to
the new law. The term law, as opposed to bill, in the Malawian setting denotes a rule or
regulation that has been passed by parliament (and assented to by the president), and is legally
enforceable.
Descriptive Statistics
Overall—i.e., in all conditions combined (Figure 3)—there is high support for a law
banning child marriage: 76% answered that they strongly support, 10% support, and 14% do not
support. Support for the law is not significantly higher among women, but it is higher in
matrilineal areas (p<.05) and among those who support gender equality a priori (p<.01).
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Figure 3. Support for banning child marriage (all conditions). Data weighted.

As shown in Figure 4, Malawians have higher trust in their TA than their MP: 53% of
respondents trust their TA very much, compared to 28% trusting their MP very much. As noted,
these findings are consistent with other studies presented in figure 1 and 2 (earlier in the article).
These questions do not distinguish between trust in leaders of different genders, nor do they
distinguish between different policy competencies, which we believe will differ across
advocates, based on their gender and possibly their institution.
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Figure 4. Trust in TAs and MPs in Malawi (%). Data weighted. For question wording: “For each
of the following, please tell me whether you trust them very much, trust them somewhat, distrust
them somewhat, or distrust them very much to work for your interests? Your Traditional
Authority. Your Member of Parliament.”

Measurement of Independent Variables for Testing Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
We also measured several independent variables pretreatment—respondent sex and
lineage system—which allow us to test our core heterogeneous hypotheses. We measure cultural
practices as the response to the question: “In your family, is lobola [bride price/dowry] paid
when people get married?” Yes (=0/Patrilineal). No (=1/Matrilineal). The sample is made up of
35% male and 65% female citizens. Among the respondents in the experiment, 51% follow a
matrilineal system, while 49% follow patrilineal customs. 13 We expect females and those from

13

In the survey, respondents from the Northern region were disproportionately sampled to

increase the patrilineal respondents. This means that the 51-49 split is a function of the sample
clustering and does not imply that there is an almost evenly split between patrilineal and
matrilineal customs in Malawi.
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matrilineal areas to have more gender role congruent views and higher trust in female leaders
than males and those from patrilineal areas.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To test the impact of messenger institution and gender, we first estimate average
treatment effects. Then we examine conditional treatment effects across independent variables
theoretically related to gender role congruity and institutional trust theory. Because the outcome
variable is measured on a Likert scale, we use ordered logistic regression rather than means
comparisons, using a methodology developed by Long and Freese (2014). Inclusion of additional
demographic control variables for which heterogeneous treatment effects, unless theoretically
justified, is unnecessary in a randomized treatment assignment and can bias estimation of the
average treatment effects (Mutz, 2011). 14
Randomization was effective across primary sampling units. However, because the
treatment was related to lineage system, we include several control variables in the models.
These include: respondent and interviewer gender (Benstead, 2014), whether the respondent
follows matrilineal or patrilineal customs, rural residence, age, income quartile, and education
level, as well as post-stratification weights. (See Appendix 2 Tables A2.1 and A2.2 for full
regression results). We also conducted robustness checks by running the models with only

14

We estimate the models using Stata 14 updated on May 1, 2017 using current update level

March 16, 2017. Replications using update levels prior or subsequent to these dates may obtain
slight differences in p values.
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respondent gender and cultural customs included and found that our results were robust to this
alternative specification.
Average Treatment Effects
Overall, as shown in Figure 5 and Table 2, support for the reform was higher when
endorsed by one of the female messengers than by either of the male messengers: 75% and 78%
strongly supported the reform when advocated by a female MP or TA, respectively, while only
74% and 72% strongly supported the reform when advocated by a male MP or TA, respectively.
The female TA was the most effective overall, while the male TA was the least effective.
However, none of the treatments were significantly different from one another.
Yet, all of the endorsements except for the female TA are significantly less effective than
the control at the p<.10. This suggests that the only treatment that did not lower support for the
reform is the female TA. In the sample as a whole, all of the other treatments produced backfire
effects. In the control condition, 80% are very likely to support the reform, compared to 78% for
the female TA, a non-significant difference. Yet, 75% strongly support the reform when it is
endorsed by the female MP, significantly fewer than in the control condition (p<.05). The
probability is 74% for the male MP (p<.10 relative to the control) and 72% for the male TA
(p<.10 relative to the control), the least effective messenger.
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Figure 5. Average treatment effects

Figure 5 shows predicted probabilities for supporting or opposing the law. Model includes controls for
respondent gender, interviewer gender, cultural customs, attitudes about gender equality, rural residence,
education, income (asset index), and age. Post-stratification weights included.
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Table 2. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons (average treatment effects)
Strongly do not support Do not support Support

Strongly support

Female MP vs. control (2 vs. 1)

.049*

0.063†

0.052†

0.037*

Female TA vs. control (3 vs.1)

0.301

0.506

0.881

0.452

Male MP vs. control (4 vs. 1)

.062†

.106

0.227

.073†

Male TA vs. control (5 vs.1)

.088†

.076†

.083†

.071†

Comparisons of treatments with control

Comparisons of institutions (State vs. traditional)
Female TA vs. MP (3 vs. 2)

0.862

0.365

0.124

0.449

Male TA vs. MP (5 vs. 4)

0.769

0.574

0.335

0.566

Male vs. female MP (4 vs. 2)

0.473

0.872

0.457

0.845

Male vs. female TA (5 vs. 3)

0.370

0.151

.078†

0.181

0.396

0.501

0.684

0.482

0.349

0.333

0.405

0.100

Comparisons of gender (Female vs. male)

Other comparisons
Male TA vs. female MP (5 vs. 2)

Male MP vs. female TA (4 vs. 3) 0.536
Pooled comparisons (Gender)
Female vs. control (2 vs. 1)

0.128

0.107

0.146

Male vs. control (3 vs. 1)

0.044*

0.047*

0.041* 0.034*

Male vs. female (3 vs. 2)

0.324

0.245

0.212

0.249

TA vs. control (2 vs. 1)

0.210

0.130

0.136

0.148

MP vs. control (3 vs. 1)

0.060†

0.076†

0.058† 0.046*

MP vs. TA (3 vs. 2)

0.883

0.864

0.923

Pooled comparisons (Institution)

0.888

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10.

We also examined pooled comparisons (Table 2) and found that, in the sample as a
whole, the female messengers (i.e., both female MP and female TA) do not differ from the
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control, but male messengers (i.e., both male MP and female TA) produce a backfire effect
relative to the control (p.05). So too, the parliamentarians lead to a backfire effect relative to the
control (p<.05).
These pooled comparisons strengthen our initial findings. None of the endorsers, overall,
are more effective in fostering support for the reform when compared to one another, the female
TA does not cause a backfire effect, relative to the control. This suggests that TAs may be
effective endorsers, but that their effect depends on their gender—an intersectional effect that
suggests support for H3. At the same time, the average treatment effects indicate some troubling
evidence about potential backfire effects that need to be further investigated through an
examination of heterogeneous effects.
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Next, we examine effects across respondent gender and cultural customs, which relate to
the likelihood of holding gender congruity views and trusting the authorities. We expect female
messengers to be more effective among female respondents than male (H4) and among
matrilineal than patrilineal (H5) respondents. This, we argue, is because female and matrilineal
citizens are likely to have more gender role congruent views and higher trust in female leaders.
Indeed, we find support for both hypotheses (H4 and H5). Among women, female
messengers are more effective than male messengers, as predicted by H4 (Figure 6 and Table 3):
85% strongly support the reform when endorsed by a female TA, while 76% support for reform
for a female MP. This compares to 68% for a male TA and 75% for a male MP. The difference
in the support for the female TA and the male TA is statistically significant (p<.05). This
suggests that for female respondents, TAs are most effective, but only in compared to the male
TA (p<.05), not the male MP, which is consistent with an intersectional theory (H3) among
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female citizens. Among male respondents, (see Appendix 2 Figure A2.1 and Table A2.3), there
are no significant differences across the messengers. This may be due in part to the smaller size
of male sample size.

Figure 6. Predicted probability, women

Figure 6 shows predicted probability of supporting the law among women.
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Table 3. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons (women)
Strongly do not support Do not support

Support Strongly support

Comparisons of treatments with control
Female MP vs. control (2 vs. 1)

0.333

0.321

0.353

0.332

Female TA vs. control (3 vs. 1)

0.998

0.935

0.862

0.937

Male MP vs. control (4 vs. 1)

0.134

0.239

0.427

0.215

Male TA vs. control (5 vs. 1)

.094†

.105

0.169

.105

Comparisons of institutions (State vs. traditional)
Female TA vs. MP (3 vs. 2)

0.325

0.249

0.154

0.234

Male TA vs. MP (5 vs. 4)

0.443

0.298

0.224

0.319

Comparisons of gender (Female vs. male)
Male vs. female MP (4 vs. 2)

0.546

0.839

0.593

0.816

Male vs. female TA (5 vs. 3)

.045*

.032*

.012*

.021*

Male TA vs. female MP (5 vs. 2) 0.200

0.230

0.300

0.215

Male MP vs. female TA (4 vs. 3) 0.257

0.291

0.283

0.258

Other comparisons

Pooled comparisons (Gender)
Female vs. control (2 vs. 1)

0.128

0.107

0.146

0.100†

Male vs. control (3 vs. 1)

0.044*

0.047*

0.041*

0.034*

Male vs. female (3 vs. 2)

0.324

0.245

0.212

0.249

TA vs. control (2 vs. 1)

0.162

0.166

0.112

0.131

MP vs. control (3 vs. 1)

0.055†

0.119

0.052†

0.053†

MP vs. TA (3 vs. 2)

0.996

0.980

0.978

0.998

Pooled comparisons (Institution)

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10.

Analysis of pooled comparisons (Table 3) shows that, among female respondents, there is
a backfire effect for male messengers relative to the control (p<.05) and for MPs relative to the
control (p<.10). Among male respondents (not shown in the table), there is a backfire effect for
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MPs relative to the control (p<.10). These findings strengthen our initial result that female TAs
are as effective as the control, but that an intersectional theory of policy advocacy is needed.
Female messengers are also more effective for matrilineal than patrilineal citizens,
consistent with H5 (Figure 7 and Table 4). Among matrilineal citizens, 83% strongly support the
reform when endorsed by a female TA, while 82% support for reform for a female MP. This
compares to 80% for a male TA and 73% for a male MP. The difference in the support for the
female MP and the male MP is statistically significant (p<.05). This suggests that for one
institution—parliament—female are more effective endorsers than male messengers (p<.05).

Figure 7. Predicted probability, Matrilineal customs

Figure 7 shows predicted probability of supporting the law among citizens with matrilineal
customs.
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Table 4. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons (matrilineal)
Strongly do not support Do not support

Support

Strongly support

Comparisons of treatments with control
Female MP vs. control (2 vs. 1)

.392

0.335

0.330

0.349

.363

0.523

0.769

0.506

Male MP vs. control (4 vs. 1)

.004**

. 004**

.002**

.001***

Male TA vs. control (5 vs. 1)

.305

0.288

0.296

0.291

Female TA vs. control (3 vs. 1)

Comparisons of institutions (State vs. traditional)
Female TA vs. MP (3 vs. 2)

.946

0.649

0.404

0.676

Male TA vs. MP (5 vs. 4)

.165

0.214

0.396

0.197

Comparisons of gender (Female vs. male)
Male vs. female MP (4 vs. 2)

.025*

.085†

0.183

.037*

Male vs. female TA (5 vs. 3)

.703

0.555

0.443

0.573

Male TA vs. female MP (5 vs. 2) .739

0.799

0.870

0.795

Male MP vs. female TA (4 vs. 3) .048*

.012*

.013*

.016*

0.470

0.482

Other comparisons

Pooled comparisons (Gender)
Female vs. control (2 vs. 1)

0.515

0.481

Male vs. control (3 vs. 1)

0.013*

0.013*

0.009** 0.007**

Male vs. female (3 vs. 2)

0.037*

0.044*

0.030*

0.029*

TA vs. control (2 vs. 1)

0.308

0.291

0.260

0.276

MP vs. control (3 vs. 1)

0.026*

0.011*

MP vs. TA (3 vs. 2)

0.221

0.180

Pooled comparisons (Institution)

0.008** 0.008**
0.199

0.192

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10.

The results of the pooled comparison among matrilineal citizens show that male
messengers cause a backfire effect relative to the control (p<.01) and are less effective than
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female messengers (p<.05). Moreover, MPs cause a backfire effect relative to the control
(p<.01). This only strengthens our initial finding about the effectiveness of female messengers
among matrilineal citizens, but the need to engage an intersectional approach that takes
messenger institution and gender into account (H3).
Among patrilineal citizens, however, this is not the case, as hypothesized (H5; Figure 8
and Table 5). Among this group, the most effective endorser is the male MP, for whom 76%
strongly support the reform. Yet, the female TA still garners the second highest support level—
72%—higher than the female MP (67%) and the male TA (63%). The difference in the support
for the male MP and TA is statistically significant (p<.05). This suggests that for one
institution—the TA—males are more effective endorsers.

Figure 8. Predicted probability, Patrilineal customs

Figure 8 shows predicted probability of supporting the law among citizens with patrilineal and
matrilineal customs.
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Table 5. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons (patrilineal)
Strongly do not support Do not support

Support Strongly support

Comparisons of treatments with control
Female MP vs. control (2 vs. 1)

0.493

0.498

0.487

0.481

0.787

0.975

0.785

0.968

Male MP vs. control (4 vs. 1)

0.868

0.633

0.399

0.648

Male TA vs. control (5 vs. 1)

0.182

0.300

0.347

0.227

Female TA vs. control (3 vs. 1)

Comparisons of institutions (State vs. traditional)
Female TA vs. MP (3 vs. 2)

0.792

0.432

0.298

0.559

Male TA vs. MP (5 vs. 4)

.036*

.020*

.003**

.005**

Comparisons of gender (Female vs. male)
Male vs. female MP (4 vs. 2)

0.272

.087†

.012*

.083†

Male vs. female TA (5 vs. 3)

.412

0.230

0.273

0.316

Male TA vs. female MP (5 vs. 2) .426

0.563

0.769

0.497

Male MP vs. female TA (4 vs. 3) 0.679

0.729

0.680

0.679

Other comparisons

Pooled comparisons (Gender)
Female vs. control (2 vs. 1)

0.483

0.452

0.430

0.451

Male vs. control (3 vs. 1)

0.407

0.465

0.538

0.450

Male vs. female (3 vs. 2)

0.798

0.681

0.466

0.693

TA vs. control (2 vs. 1)

0.210

0.130

0.136

0.148

MP vs. control (3 vs. 1)

0.060†

0.076†

0.580†

0.046*

MP vs. TA (3 vs. 2)

0.883

0.864

0.923

0.888

Pooled comparisons (Institution)

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10.

Examining pooled results (Table 5), we find that among patrilineal citizens, there is no
difference in male versus female comparisons, and the MPs are less effective than the control (a
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backfire effect) (p<.05). Among this group of respondents, the impact of the authority type
depends on the authority’s gender.
The size of the backfire effects in the heterogeneous effects analysis seems the same as
across the entire sample. However, we find that for matrilineal respondents, endorsements by
male MPs are not only the least effective, but they elicit a backfire effect, relative to the control.
Among matrilineal citizens—who are least likely to place trust in male authorities, the male MP
elicits lower support (73%) than the control (86%), significant at the p<.01 level. This is
consistent with H7ii, which anticipates several possible backfire effects. We find no support for
biased assimilation in the study.

Summary of Findings
From these findings, we draw two conclusions (see Table 6). First, we find that TAs may
be effective as messengers of women’s rights reforms among some population subgroups. Yet,
their effectiveness depends on their gender, with female TAs often more effective than male
TAs. Drawing on gender role congruity and institutional trust theories, we argue that the female
TA’s relative effectiveness compared to the other authorities is due to high public trust in TAs,
coupled with women’s stereotyped competence in the area of women’s rights. Moreover, the
female TA is the only authority type that does not create a backfire effect. The female TA
produces the higher support in the sample as a whole and among female and matrilineal citizens.
However, the female TA is not significantly more effective than the female MP. This suggests
support for H2 (gendered policy competence) and H3 (intersectional hypothesis).
Second, we find that the effectiveness of the messengers depends on the population subgroup, according to their level of trust in and gender role congruity views concerning the four
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endorsers. While the male MP is less effective than both female messengers among matrilineal
citizens (p<.05), he was the most effective messenger among patrilineal citizens (though the
difference is significant only in relation to the male TA, p<.01). While we found no support for
biased assimilation (H6) when comparing the endorsements to the control, we found evidence for
a backfire effect among matrilineal respondents (H7ii), for whom the male MP’s endorsement
decreased support relative to the control (p<.05)
Taken together, these results show that the impact of the messenger depends on the
intersection of authority type and authority gender, as well as on the type of respondent. They
also raise the specter of backfire effects—the possibility of doing harm.
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Table 6. Summary of results

Average treatment
effects

Heterogeneous
treatment effects
Female respondents

Male respondents
Matrilineal respondents

Patrilineal respondents

Most effective
endorser

Treatments
relative to
one another

Treatments
relative to
control
(backfire)

Treatments
relative to
control
(biased
assimilation)
-

Female TA, though
not significantly
more than any
other treatment or
the control

-

Female MP
(p<.05), male
MP (p<.10),
and male TA
(p<.10)
backfire
relative to
control

Female TA, though
not significantly
more than the
control, female MP,
or male MP
Female TA, though
not significantly
more than the
control, female MP,
male MP, or male
TA
Male MP, though
not significantly
more than the
control, female MP,
or female TA

Female TA
more
effective than
male TA
(p<.05)
Female MP
and female
TA more
effective than
male MP
(p<.05)
Male MP
more
effective than
male TA
(p<.01)

-

-

Male MP
(p<.001)
backfire
relative to
control

-

-

-

CONCLUSION
Both scholars and policymakers grapple with the questions of when and how TAs
provide effective governance in support of development and human rights goals. The results of
our survey experiment suggest that the answers depend on the authority’s gender and citizens’
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characteristics. We find that under particular circumstances, TAs can be more effective endorsers
of policy messages than MPs. This is the case for female TAs in the sample as a whole, as well
as among women, those who follow matrilineal customs, and those who hold supportive attitudes
about gender equality.
At the same time, our analysis suggests that the gender of the TA is important. For a
gender-sensitive child marriage reform law, female TAs and female MPs are more effective than
their male counterparts in the sample as a whole, as well as among women, those who follow
matrilineal customs, and those who hold supportive attitudes about gender equality. More
research is needed to compare the impact of these types of authorities across policies associated
with the stereotyped competencies of male and female leaders.
Our findings have important implications for the growing body of research on traditional
governance, which we extend by demonstrating the need for an intersectional theory of policy
advocacy. If traditional leaders are increasingly being seen as partners in development we need
more research into how different background characteristics such as age, gender, education, and
political engagement may affect both their capacity to carry out reforms and to what extent they
are seen as relevant drivers of change in their communities. This research could form the basis
for developing new theories of how and when traditional leaders may serve to promote or
impede change. This is particularly critical within the area of gender law reform where we need
more studies to further establish how traditional and political institutions complement one
another for more effective policy implementation.
Our findings also have implications for international agencies, national governments, and
civil-society organizations across the developing world that champion human rights initiatives
and provide traditional leaders with a significant role in the implementation of such reform
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initiatives. Traditional leaders can play a constructive role in brokering infrastructure
development projects, as well as projects aimed at enhancing gender equality. Yet, their impact
is complex in a society such as Malawi’s, whose diverse ethnic and societal practices mirror
most of Africa. Among some groups, male leaders can be effective, while in others, women are
better placed to play this role.
Some cautions are in order. The presence of traditional institutions might not always be
positive; they may sometimes undermine the role of elected representatives and the consolidation
of democracy. In the long run, this could become detrimental to women’s rights and
empowerment. Several actors can be effective endorsers among different groups, but they also
have the potential to do harm when the wrong authority pushes a policy that one or more groups
see as running counter to their interests and not falling within the authority’s supposed
competencies. Rights concerning gender equality, sexuality, and reproduction are policy areas
that are sensitive to prior beliefs and backfire effects, and reform promotion applying the
“wrong” messenger could impact the support of the reform significantly. This underscores the
need to gather context-specific information and to develop an effective strategy for engaging
citizens positively with different leaders to promote human rights reform.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Randomization Checks and Question Wording for Independent Variables
A randomized block design was used. All test showed that randomization was effective.
In order to reduce questionnaire length, a random subset of the 7,750 respondents in the LGPI
took part in the experiment. Table A1.1 shows that the 1,381 respondents who received the child
marriage endorsement study embedded in the LGPI were randomly distributed across the 15
electoral districts (p<.422).

Table A1.1. Randomized block design: Selection of respondents to take part in child
marriage endorsement experiment
Respondents not selected Respondents selected
Total
Balaka
307(85.3%)
53(14.7%)
360(100.0%)
Blantyre
571(81.6%)
129(18.4%)
700(100.0%)
Chikwawa
572(80.5%)
139(19.6%)
711 (100.1%)
Chitipa
289(82.1%)
63(17.95)
352(100.0%)
Dedza
573(80.4%)
140(19.6%)
713(100.0%)
Kasungu
280(85.6%)
47(14.4%)
327(100.0%)
Lilongwe
595(83.6%)
117(16.4%)
712 (100.0%)
Mangochi
281(81.7%)
63(18.3%)
344(100.0%)
Mulanje
294(82.6%)
62(17.4%)
356(100.0%)
Mzimba
1,144(81.4%)
262(18.6%)
1,406(100.0%)
Nkhatabay
293(84.0%)
56(16.1%)
349(100.1%)
Nsanje
281(79.4%)
73(20.6%)
354(100.0%)
Ntcheu
293(84.2%)
55(15.8%)
348(100.0%)
Rumphi
300(84.0%)
57(16.0%)
357(100.0%)
Zomba
295(81.9%)
65(18.1%)
360(100.0%)
Total
6,368(82.2%)
1,381(17.8%)
7,749(100.0%)
Two-tailed χ test shows treatments are randomly distributed across electoral districts (p<.422).
2

2

Table A1.2 shows that the 1,381 respondents who were selected to take part in the
experiment were randomly assigned to either the control or the four treatment groups (p<.891).

Table A1.2. Randomized block design: Assignment of respondents to control and
experimental conditions
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Balaka
Blantyre
Chikwawa
Chitipa
Dedza
Kasungu
Lilongwe
Mangochi
Mulanje
Mzimba
Nkhatabay
Nsanje
Ntcheu
Rumphi
Zomba
Total

53

Control
15(28.3%)
24(18.6%)
31(22.3%)
15(23.8%)
29(20.7%)
5(10.6%)
21(18.0%)
10(15.9%)
9(14.5%)
59(22.5%)
12(21.4%)
20(27.4%)
11(20.0%)
13(22.8%)
10(15.4%)

Female MP Female TA
6(11.3%)
8(15.1%)
22(17.1%) 26(20.2%)
25(18.0%) 23(16.6%)
13(20.6%) 16(25.4%)
22(15.7%) 28(20.0%)
10(21.3%)
6(12.8%)
24(20.5%) 24(20.5%)
13(20.6%) 12(19.1%)
15(24.2%) 15(24.2%)
60(22.9%) 54(20.6%)
9(16.1%)
15(26.8%)
16(21.9%) 15(20.6%)
9(16.4%)
12(21.8%)
10(17.5%) 10(17.5%)
15(23.1%) 11(16.9%)

Male MP
11(20.8%)
28(21.7%)
33(23.7%)
12(19.1%)
31(22.1%)
12(25.5%)
21(18.0%)
18(28.6%)
10(16.1%)
41(15.7%)
8(14.3%)
10(13.7%)
10(18.2%)
9(15.8%)
15(23.1%)

Male TA
13(24.5%)
29(22.5%)
27(19.4%)
7(11.1%)
30(21.4%)
14(29.8%)
27(23.1%)
10(15.9%)
13(21.0%)
48(18.3%)
12(21.4%)
12(16.4%)
13(23.6%)
15(26.3%)
14(21.5%)

Total
53(100.0%)
129(100.1%)
139(100.0%)
63(100.0%)
140(99.9%)
47(100.0%)
117(100.1%)
63(100.1%
62(100.0%)
262(100.0%)
56(100.0%)
73(100.0%)
55(100.0%)
57(99.9%)
65(100.0%)

284(20.6%)

269(19.5%)

269(19.5%)

284(20.6%)

1,381(100.1%)

275(19.9%)

Two-tailed χ test show treatments are randomly distributed across electoral districts (p<.891).
2

2

There were no differences in response rates (i.e., attrition rates) across the five
conditions. Only 12 respondents did not provide an answer on the dependent variable and
missing data was not related to condition.
Table A1.3 shows that the conditions were randomly distributed across demographic
variables, as shown by insignificant chi-square tests. Question wording and descriptive statistics
for all independent variables are also given.

Table A1.3. Randomization of treatment and descriptive statistics for independent
variables
Control
Gender
Male
Female
(N=1,378/Mean=.65/Sd=.48)
Interviewer gender
Male
Female
(N=1,377/Mean=.42/Sd=.49)
Gender role congruent views1
Prefer male

Female MP

Female TA

Male MP

Male TA

22.3%
19.7%

18.2%
18.8%
19.2%
20.2%
20.5%
19.6%
χ2(4)=2.4283(p<.658)

21.5%
20.0%

19.4%
22.2%

18.9%
20.8%
20.3%
20.3%
18.7%
18.4%
χ2(4)=2.8524(p<.583)

20.6%
20.4%

17.1%

14.1%

24.5%

20.1%

24.2%
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Prefer male or no difference
Prefer female
(N=1,350/Mean=.43/Sd=.49)
Patrilineal/Matrilineal1
Does not pay lobola (Matrilineal)
Pay lobola (Patrilineal)
(N=1,368/Mean=.49/Sd=.50)
Economic status2
First quartile
Second quartile
Third quartile
Fourth quartile
(N=1,368/Mean=2.30/Sd=1.14)
Education
No formal schooling
Some primary school
Some primary school completed
Some intermediate school or more
(N=1,366/Mean=2.32/Sd=.89)
Rural residence4
Urban or small town
Rural
(N=1,376/Mean=.81/Sd=.39)
Age groups
<25 years
25-34 years
35-44 years
>45 years
(N=1,378/Mean=2.53/Sd=1.13)
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20.8%
23.0%

19.6%
20.2%
18.9%
22.3%
19.5%
17.7%
χ2(4)=10.3154(p<.021)*

21.0%
17.6%

19.5%
21.9%

17.6%
18.2%
22.1%
21.2%
21.5%
17.0%
χ2(4)=12.6223(p<.013)*

22.7%
18.4%

20.8%
19.3%
24.5%
18.3%

18.9%
19.5%
19.3%
21.8%
17.5%
19.1%
15.9%
20.5%
21.5%
21.1%
22.2%
18.3%
χ (12)=11.1280(p<.518)

21.5%
22.1%
17.6%
20.1%

17.4%
16.4%
19.9%
19.1%
19.8%
20.7%
20.0%
20.9%
17.0%
22.5%
22.5%
18.7%
χ (12)=14.8515(p<.250)

18.9%
21.8%
18.5%
19.8%

19.8%
21.4%
19.8%
19.4%
19.5%
19.4%
χ (4)=2.0386(p<.729)

21.4%
20.4%

17.0%
20.4%
22.5%
21.1%
18.2%
19.5%
19.3%
18.9%
20.3%
20.1%
21.6%
16.4%
χ (12)=10.2369(p<.595)

21.9%
21.9%
18.6%
19.8%

2

27.4%
18.6%
23.9%
16.6%

2

17.5%
21.3%

2

18.2%
19.3%
23.0%
22.2%

2

Two-tailed χ2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across groups for all independent and control
variables, with the exception of a priori gender attitudes (p<.05) and lineal customs (p<.05). 1 The higher
the value, the more assets a household possesses. How likely would you be to vote for a female candidate
in a parliamentary election? Would you be more likely to vote for her than a male (=1/Supports), less
likely to vote for her (=0/Opposes), or would you say that there is no difference (=0/Opposes)? 2 In your
family, is lobola [bride price/dowry] paid when people get married? Yes (=0/Patrilineal). No
(=1/Matrilineal). 3 The asset index was created by performing a multiple correspondence analysis on four
assets a household could possibly possess: motor vehicle, mobile telephone, radio, and bicycle. 4 Census
designation.

We also conducted additional randomization checks for comparisons between each single
(i.e.., female MP, female TA, male MP, and male TA) and pooled condition (i.e., pooled female,
pooled male, pooled TA, and pooled MP) and the control and each single and pooled condition
with one another to determine whether the conditions are randomly distributed across each pair
of conditions. In each comparison, randomization was effective, as shown by insignificant chi
square tests of significance, with the following exceptions: (1) there are more patrilineal citizens
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who received the control than the male MP condition (p<.027), (2) there are more patrilineal
citizens who received the control than the pool male (male MP and male TA) condition (p<.016),
(3) there are more patrilineal citizens who received the female MP than the male TA condition
(p<.009), and there are more patrilineal citizens who received the male MP than the male TA
condition (p<.000). For this reason, we include controls for cultural customs in the ordered
logistic regressions.

Appendix 2: Regression Models with Controls

Appendix 2 gives the full ordered logistic regression results for the models reported in the
paper, which include control variables: respondent and interviewer gender (Benstead, 2014),
whether the respondent follows matrilineal or patrilineal customs, rural residence, age, income
quartile, and education level, as well as post-stratification weights. Tables A2.1 and A2.2 give
the ordered logistic regression results for the average treatment effects reported in Figure 5 and
Table 2, first for all four experimental conditions (Table A2.1) and second for the models pooled
by messenger gender and institution (Table A2.2).

Table A2.1. Ordered logistic model for support for child marriage reform: Average treatment
effects (Figure 5 and Table 2)
Variable

Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficients:
Average Treatment Effects (Figure 5 and
Table 2)

Experimental
Condition
Female MP (2)

.04(1.07)

Female TA (3)

.60(1.43)

Male MP (4)

-.17(.98)

Male TA (5)

-1.27(1.00)

Gender and Traditional Authorities

56

Experimental
Condition
(Female Respondent Gender)
1-1

.38(.27)

2-1

.15(.28)

3-1

.94(.43)*

4-1

.10(.33)

5-1

-.56(.40)

Experimental
Condition
(Female Interviewer Gender)
1-1

-.18(.52)

2-1

.93(.39)*

3-1

-.32(.53)

4-1

2.53(.53)***

5-1

1.05(.34)***

Experimental
Condition (Patrilineal/Lobola)
1-1

-.89(.36)*

2-1

-.84(.41)†

3-1

-.83(.38)*

4-1

.23(.41)

5-1

-.92(.39)*

Experimental
Condition (Gender Role Congruent Views/Would Vote
for Female)
1-2

-1.55(.58)**

1-3

-1.05(.63)

2-2

-.42( .55)

2-3

.04( .53)

3-2

-.34(.46)

3-3

.90(.54)

4-2

.013(.39)

4-3

-.66(.48)

5-2

.51(.48)
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.84(.44)

Experimental
Condition (q13_rural)
1-1

.24(.54)

2-1

-.25(.53)

3-1

.45(.58)

4-1

-.20(.47)

5-1

.44(.52)

Experimental
Condition (Education)
1 - Some Primary School

1.05(.52)†

1 - Primary School Complete

.67(.48)

1- Intermediate to Post-Secondary

1.33(.47)*

2 - Some Primary School

-.12(.78)

2 - Primary School Complete

-.03(.79)

2 - Intermediate to Post-Secondary

-.04(.82)

3 - Some Primary School

-.95(.78)

3 - Primary School Complete

-1.13(.76)

3 - Intermediate to Post-Secondary

-1.95(.69)*

4 - Some Primary School

.27(.51)

4 - Primary School Complete

.66(.70)

4- Intermediate to Post-Secondary

.73(.82)

5 - Some Primary School

.39(.46)

5 - Primary School Complete

-.16(.74)

5 - Intermediate to Post-Secondary

.30(.56)

Experimental
Condition (MCA1d_quartile)
1-2

-.55(.48)

1-3

.05(.45)

1-4

-.14(.74)

2-2

.07(.51)

2-3

-.38(.54)

2-4

-.94(.59)

Gender and Traditional Authorities

58

3-2

-.64(.64)

3-3

-1.13(.61)†

3-4

.06(.61)

4-2

-1.16(.45)*

4-3

-.50(.28)†

4-4

-.50(.41)

5-2

.25(.45)

5-3

-.17(.61)

5-4

-.99(.32)**

Experimental
Condition (Age_groups)
1-2

.33(.61)

1-3

.63(.52)

1-4

1.42(.72)†

2-2

.84(.34)*

2-3

.09(.37)

2-4

.54(.42)

3-2

.80(.63)

3-3

.28(.65)

3-4

-.03(.51)

4-2

-.48(.38)

4-3

-.77(.57)

4-4

-.43(.66)

5-2

.70(.71)

5-3

.62(.79)

5-4

.27(.52)

/cut1

-2.69(.75)**

/cut2

-2.21(.75)**

/cut3

-1.41(.75)†

N

1334

Population Size

5,190,307

Design DF

19

Number of Strata

3

Gender and Traditional Authorities

59

Number of PSUs

22

Number of Poststrata

147

Adjusted Wald Test (F)
Female MP-Female TA (2-3)

F(1,19)=.09

Female MP-Male MP (2-4)

F(1,19)=.03

Female MP-Male TA (2-5)

F(1,19)=.83

Female TA-Male MP (3-4)

F(1,19)=0.32

Female TA-Male TA (3-5)

F(1,19)=2.17

Male MP-Male TA (4-5)

F(1,19)=.92

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2.2. Ordered logistic model for support for child marriage reform: Average treatment
effects, Pooled models (Figure 5 and Table 2)
Variable

Ordered Logistic
Regression
Coefficient:
Average Treatment
Effects (Figure 5 and
Table 2)

Experimental
Condition

Variable

Ordered Logistic
Regression
Coefficient:

Experimental
Condition

Female MP (2)

.29(.89)

Female MP (2)

-.89(.96)

Female TA (3)

-1.15(.92)

Female TA (3)

-.59(.83)

Experimental
Condition
(Female Respondent
Gender)

Experimental
Condition
(Female Respondent
Gender)

1-1

.38( .26)

1-1

.38(.26)

2-1

.44(.27)

2-1

.08(.22)

3-1

-.11(.28)

3-1

.16(.21)

Experimental
Condition
(Female Interviewer
Gender)

Experimental
Condition
(Female Interviewer
Gender)

1-1

-.18(.51)

1-1

-.18(.51)

2-1

.21(.25)

2-1

.48(.29)

3-1

1.60(.33)***

3-1

1.71(.29)***

Gender and Traditional Authorities

Experimental
Condition (Lobola)

60

Experimental
Condition (Lobola)

1-1

-.88(.36)*

1-1

-.88(.36)*

2-1

-1.01(.24)***

2-1

-.87(.32)*

3-1

-.33(.24)

3-1

-.23(.35)

Experimental
Condition (Gender Role
Congruent Views/Would
Vote for Female)

Experimental
Condition (Gender Role
Congruent Views/Would
Vote for Female)

1-2

-1.54(.58)*

1-2

-1.54(.58)*

1-3

-1.05(.62)

1-3

-1.05(.62)

2-2

-.31(.30)

2-2

.04(.34)

2-3

.52(.27)†

2-3

.80(.36)*

3-2

.26(.23)

3-2

-.29(.33)

3-3

-.02(.40)

3-3

-.39(.37)

Experimental
Condition (Rural)

Experimental
Condition (Rural)

1-1

.24(.53)

1-1

.24(.53)

2-1

.08(.33)

2-1

.45(.36)

3-1

.08(.33)

3-1

-.24(.43)

Experimental
Condition (Education)

Experimental
Condition (Education)

1 - Some Primary School

1.04(.51)†

1 - Some Primary School

1.04(.52)†

1 - Primary School
Complete

.66(.48)

1 - Primary School
Complete

.66(.48)

1- Intermediate to PostSecondary

1.32(.46)**

1- Intermediate to PostSecondary

1.32(.46)**

2 - Some Primary School

-.48(.52)

2 - Some Primary School

.11(.45)

2 - Primary School
Complete

-.46(.49)

2 - Primary School
Complete

-.32(.56)

2 - Intermediate to PostSecondary

-.93(.54)

2 - Intermediate to PostSecondary

-.39(.42)

3 - Some Primary School

.54(.41)

3 - Some Primary School

.28(.46)

3 - Primary School
Complete

.39(.61)

3 - Primary School
Complete

.49(.53)

3 - Intermediate to PostSecondary

.85(.52)

3 - Intermediate to PostSecondary

.71(.55)

Gender and Traditional Authorities

Experimental
Condition (MCA1d
Quartile)

61

Experimental
Condition (MCA1d
Quartile)

1-2

-.55(.47)

1-2

-.55(.47)

1-3

.05(.45)

1-3

.05(.45)

1-4

-.14(.73)

1-4

-.14(.73)

2-2

-.25(.41)

2-2

.03(.35)

2-3

-.73(.42)

2-3

-.47(.42)

2-4

-.48(.40)

2-4

-.36(.25)

3-2

-.48(.33)

3-2

-.42(.43)

3-3

-.34(.30)

3-3

-.31(.31)

3-4

-.90(.30)**

3-4

-.78(.46)

Experimental
Condition (Age Groups)

Experimental
Condition (Age Groups)

1-2

.32(.61)

1-2

.32(.61)

1-3

.63(.52)

1-3

.63(.51)

1-4

1.41(.71)†

1-4

1.41(.71)†

2-2

.90(.34)*

2-2

.76(.45)

2-3

.19(.32)

2-3

.71(.38)†

2-4

.30(.30)

2-4

.18(.33)

3-2

.42(.46)

3-2

.37(.20)†

3-3

.10(.58)

3-3

-.04(.29)

3-4

.26(.51)

3-4

.39(.30)

/cut1

-2.63(.73)**

/cut1

-2.64(.74)**

/cut2

-2.18(.74)**

/cut2

-2.18(.74)**

/cut3

-1.42(.75)†

/cut3

-1.43(.74)†

N

1,334

N

1,334

Population Size

5,190,307

Population Size

5,190,307

Design DF

19

Design DF

19

Number of Strata

3

Number of Strata

3

Number of PSUs

22

Number of PSUs

22

Number of Poststrata

147

Number of Poststrata

147

Adjusted Wald Test (F)

Adjusted Wald Test (F)

Gender and Traditional Authorities

Female MP-Female TA (2- F(1,19)=2.68
3)

62

Female MP-Female TA (2- F(1,19)=.08
3)

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A2.1. Predicted probability, men

Table A2.3. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons (male)
Strongly do not support Do not support

Support Strongly support

Comparisons of treatments with control
Female MP vs. control (2 vs. 1)

.475

.368

.284

.381

Female TA vs. control (3 vs. 1)

.197

.193

.221

.174

Male MP vs. control (4 vs. 1)

.202

.400

.844

.352

Gender and Traditional Authorities

Male TA vs. control (5 vs. 1)

.908

63

.800

.728

.828

Comparisons of institutions (State vs. traditional)
Female TA vs. MP (3 vs. 2)

.429

.571

.783

.514

Male TA vs. MP (5 vs. 4)

.345

.362

.574

.375

Comparisons of gender (Female vs. male)
Male vs. female MP (4 vs. 2)

.707

.937

.391

.971

Male vs. female TA (5 vs. 3)

.287

.239

.233

.249

Male TA vs. female MP (5 vs. 2) .414

.219

.166

.273

Male MP vs. female TA (4 vs. 3) .592

.466

.293

.467

Other comparisons

Pooled comparisons (Gender)
Female vs. control (2 vs. 1)

.287

.191

.148

.206

Male vs. control (3 vs. 1)

.517

.484

.463

.483

Male vs. female (3 vs. 2)

.675

.633

.563

.634

TA vs. control (2 vs. 1)

.210

.130

.136

.148

MP vs. control (3 vs. 1)

.060†

.076†

.058†

.046*

MP vs. TA (3 vs. 2)

.883

.864

.923

.888

Pooled comparisons (Institution)

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10.

